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The Rules of the Game for Eurozone Debtors:
Will the 21st Century See Effective Reform
or Financial Calamity?
CODY T. PERLMETER*
Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws.
-Mayer Amschel Rothschild, 1790**
Abstract
The ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the European Union threatens a global financial meltdown.
An instance of default by one such country could trigger contagion with striking parallels to the
economic turmoil of 2008-2009, or perhaps worse. Many EU countries simply cannot pay their
bills, and so they dig deeper into debt to pay obligations that come due. Legal efforts to solve this
problem have not, to this point, produced a lasting remedy. Current and prospective reforms,
limited as they are by political realities, may indeed be insufficient to avoid an instance of default in
the long-run. If so, how can policymakers minimize the turbulence ahead?
I. Introduction
The economic situation in Europe is a shambles. The strained finances of numerous
Member States of the European Union (EU or Union) represent at best a serious problem
for the continent, at worst an inexorable crisis to the global economy and an existential
threat to the Union itself.' Many of these countries have borrowed to the hilt and fend off
the prospect of default only by borrowing yet more.2 If insolvency is indeed unavoidable,
these states need a legal mechanism through which they can resolve their untenable finan-
* The author expresses his appreciation to Phillip Spinella, Scott Ferebee, and Jim Campbell for advising;
above all else, to those around the world working tirelessly to remedy the sovereign debt crisis-it would be
impossible to overstate the importance and challenge of their task.
* This attribution is accepted, though the primary source is unavailable. See http://www.themoneymas
ters.com/the-money-masters/famous-quotations-on-banking/.
1. See David McHugh, Economist. Euro Crisis Could Erupt Again This Year, AP: THE BiG STORY, (an. 25,
2013, 10:31 AM), available at http/bigstory.ap.org/article/economist-euro-crisis-could-erupt-again-year.
2. See Eurozone Crisis Explained, BBC NEws (June 19, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
16290598 (depicting in bar graphs the growing debt burdens of various EU member states over time).
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cial position while minimizing collateral damage to the broader economy. Yet many con-
tend that the currently planned legal structure is inadequate to meet the challenges at
hand.3 Whether the timing and substance of such recent and near-term reforms yield a
solution remains to be seen. For instance, the recent Treaty on Stability, Coordination,
and Governance in the European Monetary Union (TSCG or Fiscal Compact)-entered
into force at the beginning of 2013 and representing part of the latest efforts to solve this
crisis-could be part of a bold, effective plan to right the ship, or in the alternative, noth-
ing more than wishful thinking by politicians and bureaucrats who have repeatedly proven
themselves to be a step behind this unfolding crisis.4
Unfortunately, the question of what constitutes optimal legal reform for the European
Union is not the sole concern. There has been litigation to vie over the predicate ques-
tion, who gets to decide what reforms will be implemented?5 With legal regimes that
overlap yet remain far from seamless, the Member States of the Union have a sovereign
debt crisis that is unique in its challenges and that will thus require a unique legal solution.
To evaluate the viability of prospective legal reform, context is key. That which is palat-
able legally may be untenable in the marketplace. The court cannot enjoin financial panic
or contagion. And the financial dynamics are just one constraint on viable legal reform.
Reform instituted to solve the EU sovereign debt problem may take effect on current legal
terms, only then to fail in the face of subsequent political opposition. A political backdrop
increasingly hostile to recent reform-in creditor and debtor countries alike-represents,
then, a second limiting force upon any sort of legal reform and it must be taken into
account in crafting any realistic solution.6
A. TYING THE GORDIAN KNOT
Years before the worldwide financial crisis of 2008-2009 (Credit Crisis), the default or
near-default of various third-world nations on their sovereign debt obligations brought to
the fore the extraordinary danger posed by a resolution process so unruly and fraught with
uncertainty.7 These seemingly isolated events in faraway lands brought quick and severe
punishment to major markets, demonstrating the risks of contagion in an increasingly
interconnected global marketplace. Very rapidly, a sovereign default in Russia could
threaten the existence of a hedge fund in Connecticut, which could in turn threaten the
entire banking system and world economy.8 In turn, the centuries-old question of how
countries could work together to best resolve instances of sovereign insolvency again be-
3. See, e.g., PHILLIPP BAGUS, THE TRAGEDY OF THE EURO 126-27 (2010).
4. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, Mar. 2,
2012, available at http://european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/stOOtscg26_enl2.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, 2012 (unpublished), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsPnum=C-370/12.
6. See Mark Thompson, Greece's Misery Won't End with Bailout Vote, CNN MONEY (Nov. 6, 2012, 8:24
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/06/news/economy/greece-bailoutlindex.html.
7. See generally Mardi Dungey, et al., Int'l Monetary Fund [IMFI, IMF Working Paper: International Conta-
gion Effects fron the Russian Crisis and the LTCM Near-Collapse, WP/02/74 (Apr. 2002), available at http-//www.
imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0274.pdf.
8. Id.
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came a topic of focus for academics.9 As with many collective action problems, however,
the theorizing flowed easily while the policy-making lagged. Following the Argentinian
debt crisis, several years passed while loose monetary policy, primarily out of the United
States, flooded the world market with borrowed cash, bidding up the value of assets across
the globe from home prices to stock markets to pensions.' 0 The need for action on the
issue of sovereign debt restructuring was again obscured, as times were good and budget
projections were rosy.
The Credit Crisis that swept across the world several years ago has many theorized
causes and many documented effects that this paper will not undertake to analyze. One
relevant effect, however, was to crystallize the woeful financial state of many of the world's
developed economies, particularly in the Eurozone." As job losses and asset devaluation
led to less-than-anticipated tax receipts for government coffers, sovereigns from Greece to
the United Kingdom faced yawning budget deficits and the concomitant need to finance
this divide between tax collections and expenditures.12 Some countries gambited, taking
on even more debt to fund stimulative fiscal policies intended to fuel their economies and,
in turn, tax revenue.1 3 Other countries hunkered down, taking an austere fiscal track to
bring budget projections in order by reining in future spending.14 Meanwhile, private
demand in the financial markets soaked up the bonds issued to finance sovereign deficits;
many investors, recently burned in the market downturn, sought a safer play than tradi-
tional corporate investments and thought they had found it in sovereign debt investing.'1
In exchange for a periodic payment of interest on the bonds and a promise to repay the
borrowings in full at a later date-perhaps a year or a decade later-these troubled econo-
mies secured what they desperately needed: more borrowed money and, thus, time to let
their economies heal and their budgets snap back into order. But as the first decade of the
millennium drew to a close and a new one began, this hope proved unrealistic; many
sovereign budget projections within the Eurozone not only failed to improve, but instead
deteriorated further.16 In response, the private sector that had just so recently warmed to
the perceived protection of sovereign credit began to look upon nations such as Ireland,
Greece, and others as having dubious financial prospects of their own. The notion that
the budget deficits facing these countries were actually structural rather than temporary
gained traction, and investors in turn demanded a higher rate of interest in return for
9. See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, The Reform of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process: Problems,
Proposed Solutions and the Argentine Episode, I J. OF RESTRUCTURING FIN. 1, 1-13 (2004), available at www.
stern.nyu.edu/-nroubini/papers/debtreform.pdf.
10. See Bill Thomas, Keith Hennessey & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, What Caused the Financial Crisis?, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at 12, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870469800457610450
0524998280.html.
11. Eurozone Crisis Explained, supra note 2.
12. See id.
13. See Anders Aslund, Why Austerity Works and Stimulus Doesn't, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7, 2013, 5:55 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-07/why-austerity-works-and-fiscal-stimulus-doesn-t.html.
14. See id.
15. See Liz Alderman & Susanne Craig, Europe's Banks Found Safety of Bonds a Costly Illusion, N.Y. TrMES,
Nov. 11, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/11/11/business/global/sovereign-debt-turns-
sour-in-euro-zone.html?pagewanted=all.
16. See Thompson, supra note 6.
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providing the same quantity of lending.17 This increase in projected interest service cost
(the aggregate cost paid by an entity to fulfill payment obligations arising from interest
owed on its debts) made the budgetary picture darker still for these countries, further
scaring away potential lenders, and the vicious cyclicality of a debt spiral began to appear a
real threat. s But where the Credit Crisis saw industry leap into the arms of government,
where could these very governments now find safe harbor?
B. THE CENTRAL BANK DIS cnoN
Countries struggling to borrow in the private market have either one or two options
available to them. First, intergovernmental financial entities-principally the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund ([MF)-exist to affect lending programs to a target country from a
consortium of contributing countries.19 With these loans, however, come terms set forth
by the IMF regime meant to right the borrowing country's troubled financial path.20 The
release of each tranche of IMF lending is often conditioned upon a tightening of fiscal
policy within the borrowing country and the attainment by that country of certain fiscal
and monetary benchmarks.21 Crucially, this requires that the constituents of a borrowing
country will accede to the reforms put upon them from bureaucrats abroad. 22 IntranSi-
gence on the part of the borrowing country to comply with the terms of IMF lending may
compel a decision from the organization to withhold additional funding, almost assuredly
bringing about default. 23 For countries without control of their monetary policy, such
forms of intergovernmental lending are the only meaningful option available.
Countries that maintain autonomous central banking authority, however, can draw
upon an entirely different resource. Traditionally, a central bank could cheapen the cost
of borrowing money during a recession in order to stimulate its domestic economy.24
This outcome is generally achieved through a central bank's manipulation of important
17. See Eurozone Crisis Explained, supra note 2 (depicting, in line graph form, rising interest rates on various
EU member states over the period of time in question).
18. See Michael Schuman, Spain's Death Spiral and the Hypocrisy of the Euro, TIME (Apr. 5, 2012), http://
business.time.com/2012/04/05/spains-death-spiral-and-the-hypocrisy-of-the-euro/ (describing this cyclical-
ity-generally known as a debt spiral or death spiral-in the case of Spain's sovereign debt crisis). The
informal name "death spiral" speaks to the consequence for an entity that is increasingly weakened by grow-
mg interest service costs from growing debt and an attendant diminishment of investor confidence. Skepti-
cism from the investing community translates into higher interest rates demanded by them to effect
subsequent lending. The cycle perpetuates until the entity collapses (or is saved by some extrinsic
circumstance).




22. In effect, the terms of IMF lending must be accepted at three levels. The IMF and the borrowing
country are directly involved, and the borrowing country's citizenry has a derivative power over the approval
by way of changing the mandate of its democratic representation.
23. See Peter Spiegel, Alan Beattie & Joshua Chaffin, IMF Threatens to Withhold Greek Loan, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 15, 2011, 8:46 PM), http-J/www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/b6ded476-dfb2-1leO-8el5-00144feabdcO.html#ax
zz2KVSRolqd.
24. See, e.g., Bob Davis, Aaron Back & Lingling Wei, China Cuts Key Interest Rates, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 5,
2012, 1:51 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052702303962304577507510579917988.html.
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short-term interest rates. 25 But through a newer process known as "Quantitative Easing,"
a country could potentially rely upon its own central bank to purchase that country's
bonds.26 Though many experts regard this method of financing tantamount to simply
printing money27 (and warn of its dire long-term inflationary consequences), the near-
term benefits to the capital markets are undeniable.28 Where IMF lending requires har-
monious execution of an agreed-upon fiscal plan between bureaucrats and politicians
across countries, central bank lending is conditional upon only the compliance of a coun-
try's own central bank. With a more direct alignment of interests, central bank funding
can reasonably be viewed as a more assured source of financing than IMF funding. Inves-
tors, emboldened by the belief that a central bank will support the asset class into which
they are investing, are naturally encouraged to re-enter the market for that country's
bonds.29 By these direct and indirect means, Quantitative Easing bids up bond prices and
drives down yields for sovereign debt, thereby reducing interest payments owed by the
debtor nation and lowering overall interest service cost.30 This has the opposite cyclical
effect of a debt spiral; brightening the budgetary outlook brings yet more investors who
sense financial viability (at least over some finite period) in the borrowing country.
Quantitative Easing is controversial monetary policy.31 Opponents of Quantitative
Easing typically contend that a nation willing to print money in an ad hoc manner will
inevitably undermine the integrity of that nation's currency. 32 Further, many believe that
central bank purchases of bonds only hide the inevitable, unavoidable problem of growing
sovereign debt by allowing politicians to defer taking action to balance the budget.33 This
25. See id. A central bank may announce a new target interest rate and then, through its own actions in the
financial markets, affect the supply-demand dynamics of money such that the bank achieves its desired influ-
ence over the price (i.e. interest rate) of borrowed money in the marketplace. Thus, the interest rate is better
understood as being manipulated, rather than set.
26. See BoE Stops Quantitative Easing as Inflation Worries Weigh, REUTTERS (May 10, 2012, 7:10 AM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/10/britain-boe-rates-idUSL5E8GA65320120510 [hereinafter BoE Stops
QE].
27. See Jeremy Warner, Money Printing Has Only Allowed Governments to Duck Their Problems, THE TELE-
GRAPH (Sept. 19, 2012, 9:10 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeremy-warner/9554201/
Money-printing-has-only-allowed-governments-to-duck-their-problems.html.
28. See Philip Aldrick, The Case For andAgainst Quantitative Easing, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 6, 2011, 12:12
PM), httpi/www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/interestrates/8810763/The-case-for-and-against-quanti
tative-easing.html.
29. See Bank of Int'l Settlements [BIS], The Financial Market Impact of UK Quantitative Easing, at 288, BIS
Papers No. 65 (May 2012), available at www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap65p-rh.pdf.
30. There is an inverse relationship between the price of a bond and the overall return an investor can
expect from purchasing that bond. Because a given bond may have a fixed amount of interest to be paid on it,
acquiring that bond at a price above or below its issuance price will change the expectations for interest
earned on the money invested in that bond. A quick example: If X is a ten-year bond issued to a first pur-
chaser at 100 Euros, paying 10 percent interest each year, and X quickly is traded to a second purchaser in the
financial markets for 10 Euros (i.e. a 90 percent decrease), then the second purchaser will have an economic
expectation of a 100 percent effective interest rate in that first year-10 Euros invested to earn 10 Euros in
one year-rather than a 10 percent return, which was the rate established at issuance. The repayment of
principal at the bond's maturity date adds additional complexity, but does not alter this inverse dynamic.
31. See, e.g., John Tamny, Ben Bernanke's Quantitative Easing: The Monetary Policy of the Adolescent, FORBES
(Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntanmy/2012/12/08/ben-bemankes-quantitative-easing-the-
monetary-policy-of-the-adolescent/.
32. See Id.
33. See Warner, supra note 27.
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skeptical view of Quantitative Easing has meaningful political backing internationally.34
Therefore, while Quantitative Easing does not have legal limitations, per se, there is
enough suspicion of the practice that its scope seems practically limited. 3s For instance,
England, an EU Member State with an autonomous central bank, employed Quantitative
Easing in response to the domestic recession that followed the Credit Crisis, yet the Bank
of England stopped the program short of its desired stimulative goal. Opposition, both
inside and outside the bank, expressed skepticism of the bond-buying program.36 Many
criticized the uneven benefits conferred by Quantitative Easing; while the practice does
much to support prices in the capital markets, boosting the wealth of those who are sub-
stantially invested therein (that is to say, very wealthy individuals and institutions), its
effect of lowering interest rates poses a problem for those who planned to survive upon
the limited income generated by their savings (for instance, middle-class retirees).37 This
divergence of benefit amongst economic classes is a key political challenge of Quantitative
Easing wherever it occurs around the globe; in a democracy, will the majority tolerate
monetary policy that putatively strengthens the economy, but patently helps the wealthiest
at the expense of certain others? This conflict inherent in a monetary policy that bids up
asset prices and drives down yields is perhaps at its worst in the European Union, where
the tug-of-war extends not just across socio-economic classes, but also national
boundaries.38
II. The Curious Case of the Eurozone
The Eurozone bears the awkward combination of a unified monetary policy yet largely
independent fiscal policies amongst its constituent states (Euro States).39 While the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) singularly dictates monetary policy for Euro States-control-
ling the money supply, fixing interest rates, and, of late, purchasing government bonds-
each of these sovereigns was essentially independent in its domestic decisions regarding
how and how much to tax and spend.40 Logically, this was a necessary step along the path
to closer integration; at the outset of the Euro, it would have been unreasonable for a
more productive, surplus nation to make choices on spending and taxation that were uni-
form with a less productive, debtor nation. Beyond just cultural and economic asymme-
try, this monetary-fiscal compromise reflected a discomfort many expressed in
unnecessarily ceding localized authority to a central entity.4' The goal, it seems, was for
Euro States to enjoy the financial benefits of uniformity and efficiency while protecting
34. See, e.g., Christine Kim, South Korea Central Bank Boosts Rhetoric Against QE Spillover, REUTERS (Jan. 28,
2013, 12:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/28/korea-economy-currency-idUSS6E8LM01220
130128.
35. See, e.g., BoE Stops QE, supra note 26.
36. Id.
37. See Anthony Randazzo, How Quantitative Easing Helps the Rich and Soaks the Rest of Us, REASON.COM
(Sept. 13, 2012), http://reason.com/archives/2012/09/13/occupy-the-fed.
38. To wit, the ECB may undertake bond purchases of a given country's sovereign debt, but such a decision
by the ECB would leave other countries of the European Union on the book for prospective losses associated
with such purchasing.
39. See Soft Centre, EcoNomusT, June 11, 2009, at 14, available at http://www.economist.com/node/13767
419.
40. See Id.
41. BAGUS, supra note 3, at 1-10.
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important aspects of state sovereignty. In the beginning decade of the Eurozone, this goal
seemed satisfied, by and large; Euro States essentially managed their own fiscal affairs
while the Euro-commonly used among them and managed by the ECB-saw a mean-
ingful long-run appreciation against the U.S. Dollar.42
A. THERE Is No SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH
The Credit Crisis rendered many Euro States unhappy partners. The outsized debts
accrued by many of these countries during the recession made painfully evident that which
they had traded away in exchange for common-currency efficiency, the right to control
their own currency.43 Whereas almost every country on the planet retained this control
through a central bank44-from some of the poorest to the richest-Euro States had ef-
fectively abdicated this role to the ECB.4s Thus, as clouds darkened overhead in the mar-
ket for sovereign debt, these troubled Euro states had a relatively constrained set of policy
options: dramatically slash the budget, or seek intergovernmental funding. Initially, the
IMF did come to the rescue. 46 But when the IMF's lending criteria were chronically left
unfulfilled, the prospect of the IMF's withholding future loans and subsequent default by
the borrowing nation loomed large. The market price of outstanding debts of these Euro
States plummeted, causing interest rates to skyrocket, and circumstances grew worse still.
On the other side of the table, the healthier economies of Europe found themselves stuck;
they had no legal authority to impose fiscal controls on their fellow members, and yet the
prospect of default and disassociation of an insolvent nation from the Euro would entail
panic in the market and potentially catastrophic financial losses that could plunge the
world back into chaos.47 In sum, the strong and the weak of Europe were locked in a sort
of unworkable marriage. The healthier states could not effectively disassociate from the
disastrous economic circumstances of their partners, while the weak could not simply
print money (without the consent of the ECB) to pay down or simply inflate away their
debts.
This quagmire cast new attention on the need for legal reform in the sovereign debt
market. Searching for a solution to a crisis that was quickly gathering steam, policymakers
and bureaucrats from across the world turned their attention to the issue that had long
been languishing in academia. The relevant parties, representing wildly different constit-
uent interests, undertook to find a permanent, unified legal reformation to solve the sov-




visited Aug. 15, 2013).
43. Soft Centre, supra note 39.
44. See Central Bank and Monetary Authority Websites, BANK FOR INT'L SET-TLENIENTs, http://www.bis.org/
cbanks.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
45. See Soft Centre, supra note 39.
46. Factsheet: IMF's Response to the Global Economic Crisis, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 29, 2013), http://
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/changing.htm.
47. See Thompson, supra note 6.
48. See Christopher Alessi, The Eurozone in Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.cfr.org/eu/eurozone-crisis/p22055.
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B. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Bankruptcy and related legal structures differ widely between nations. An individual
debtor in arrears may find himself subject to relatively harsh or lenient treatment, depend-
ing on the country in which he finds himself. In some countries, for instance the United
Arab Emirates, a non-paying debtor is potentially subject to criminal charges and a prison
sentence.49 On the other hand, a debtor in the United States may potentially default and
yet maintain millions of dollars of assets.50 Despite this large variance in treatment, devel-
oped nations are consistent insofar as they each have some pre-established manner of
dealing with instances of domestic bankruptcy. These legal mechanisms diminish uncer-
tainty and bring about greater economic efficiency; lenders, armed with this information,
are better able to assess risk and in turn lend at lower rates to borrowers in need of financ-
ing.5 1 Lenders will either receive interest payments and an eventual repayment of princi-
pal or they will seek out legal redress for that which is owed to them through bankruptcy
or a related process. Either way, there is some manner of clear path ahead. Intuitively,
what underpins these systems of law for debtors is a state's monopoly of power and au-
thority over its own citizens.
The international network of debtor and creditor nations operates in stark contrast to
the above. Rather than disputes being governed under consistent rule of law, each of the
many sovereign defaults in history seems to have its own unique story.52 Such examples
have shown that at times the more pertinent matter is not the size of debts and credits but
rather the size of armies. It is the victor in war who may coerce reparations. It is the larger
country that may compel repayment of debts owed by a smaller country. Because there is
no monopoly of power between states, there is no reliable structure to sovereign insol-
vency. In a way, it is quite similar to the Wild West; the existence of legal rights and
protections does not by any means imply their enforcement. This is less the case in recent
history than in the time of empires, and sovereign defaults today are quite unlikely to end
in war.53 But through debt repudiation or hyperinflation, countries can still exercise their
intrinsic rights of sovereignty, much to the displeasure of creditors.54 Despite this chaotic
history of international financial affairs, the Euro States set out in 1993 to bind themselves
49. See Hussain Eisa Shiri, The Court's Approach in Bankruptcy Cases under Existing UAE Law, TAMIM1.COM
(Apr. 2012), http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-6/april-4/the-courts-approach-in-
bankruptcy-cases-under-existing-uae-law.html.
50. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Editorial Observer; Bankruptcy Reform That Spares the Wealthy, N.Y. TIMEs, May
9, 1999, at 4.16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/09/opinion/editorial-observer-bankruptcy-re
form-that-spares-the-wealthy.html.
51. It is intuitive that investor uncertainty diminishes investment activity; investors deploy capital in order
to earn a profit from expected future activity. Uncertainty (from an unstable legal regime, for example) will
cloud the expected outcome, making investors less likely to take such action.
52. See generally Frederico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Sovereign Defaults and Debt Restructurings:
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together with a series of treaties and amendments that, for better or worse, would place
them under one common currency.55
C. A SUPERFICIAL DISCIPLINE
The Treaty on European Union (TEU or Maastricht Treaty) was the seminal document
in creating the Euro currency and the Eurozone.56 It is the foundation for subsequent
reform and provides the context in which they must be analyzed.
On its face, the TEU holds out terms that require serious fiscal discipline; criteria for
admission to the Eurozone, known as the Euro Convergence Criteria, ostensibly place
conservative fiscal benchmarks upon applicant countries.57 Limits were set on an appli-
cant country's allowable deficits, debt, and other key economic metrics.58 As a comple-
ment to these admission criteria, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was signed in
1997.59 These additional terms stipulated that a country, once admitted into the
Eurozone, must either demonstrate ongoing compliance with these fiscal criteria or face
the prospect of economic sanctions.60 One may rightly wonder about the logic of a legal
structure set to impose fines upon a country struggling to regain its financial footing.
From the terms of the Euro Convergence Criteria, it is reasonable to infer that the
drafters sensed the danger of a single fiscal renegade within their monetary union. Any
implacable insolvency of one Euro State would require either some manner of indefinite
sovereign welfare or otherwise a disassociation from the Euro by that country. Neither
option appeals.
Unfortunately, the fiscal reality among the Euro States wasted no time in betraying the
conservatism "mandated" in the Convergence Criteria and the SGP terms, setting the
Eurozone upon its troubled course from the very beginning.61 Numerous Euro States
failed to meet the Convergence Criteria upon admission, and yet more failed to live up to
the terms of the SGP after entry into the Eurozone. 62 Even Germany, considered a finan-
cial exemplar within the Eurozone, failed to adhere to the terms to which it had assented
in writing.63 The frequent breach of treaty terms evinced the obvious flaw of the SGP
legal structure. The countries were basically designed to punish themselves in order to
maintain financial discipline.64 It is therefore less than shocking that corners were cut.
Further still, the balance of power between larger, more politically influential Euro States
and smaller Euro States rendered the measures of the SGP essentially meaningless. The
powerful states would not sanction themselves, nor would the weak seek to punish the
powerful, and perhaps for fear of hypocrisy, the most discipline ever meted out under the
55. Europe Without Frontiers, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1990-1999/indexen.htm
(last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
56. Id.





62. See MICHELE CHANG, REFORMING THE STABILITY AND GROwi PACT: SIZE AND INFLUENCE IN
EMU POLICYMAKING (1995), http://aei.pitt.edu/3159//Chang_2005.EUSA-paper.pdf.
63. See BAGUS, supra note 3, at 30-33.
64. Id.
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SGP-even to the smaller states-culminated in nothing more than saber rattling.65 In
parallel, countries seeking admission to the Eurozone skirted the Convergence Criteria by
obscuring their financial position with accounting tricks.66 Italy was allowed to adopt the
Euro despite clear evidence, known by the relevant parties at the time of admission, that
the country was not within the bounds of acceptable debt-to-GDP as required by the
Convergence Criteria.67 Subsequent investigation suggests that political considerations,
rather than economic diligence, cleared Italy's path to the Eurozone. 68 These first excep-
tions begat yet bigger ones, as newcomers could argue precedence as a waiver for their
own financial disorder.69 By the time of Greece's admission to the Eurozone, the superfi-
ciality of the SGP's written fiscal constraints on the Euro States was plainly obvious. And
even though crises often succeed recklessness, the absence of any legal mechanism within
the European Union to triage such a problem seemed to persist without much protest.
For a time, the capital market's appetite for sovereign debt gave Euro States the only
pretense needed to ignore one another's fiscal disorder. Because there was no prayer from
debtor nations for intergovernmental relief, there was no imposition upon the strong from
the weak. Hence, there was no meaningful catalyst to convert the latent problem of
snowballing sovereign debt into the headline-grabbing emergency it would soon become.
As late as 2005, the Eurozone, led by Germany and France, undertook to liberalize the
SGP criteria so that the terms would better accommodate the looser economic reality.70
But when the Credit Crisis set in across the globe, it exposed the tenuous nature of ob-
taining financing in the private market. Weaker Euro States-typified by Greece-rang
the alarm bell. This time, the whole world took notice. In short order, it was not just
Greece, but Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and others that began to see rising interest
service costs and threatened solvency, as private lenders tightened the financing spigot.71
III. A Bailout to Save the Eurozone
The European Union acted quickly in order to stem the danger of Greek default and
the contagious effect that this prospect bore on similarly situated Euro States. In tandem
with the IMF, the Eurozone agreed in 2010 to provide emergency lending to Greece in
the form of a three-year, 110 billion Euro loan in order to stave the prospect of the coun-
try's default. In return, Greece promised to reform its fiscal policy, imposing measures of
austerity intended to improve its budget projections. 72 Within days, massive anti-austerity
protests shook Greece.73 Greeks took to the streets in thousands.74 Several Greek citi-
65. Id.
66. Id.
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zens were killed in the riots, and buildings were set on fire.7s This rioting was a harbinger
of sorts, not just for Greece, but for any debtor nation subject to such imposed austerity.
The looming threat was (and remains) that an otherwise viable course of reform could
suddenly be voided from the inside out, should a democratic country's constituents decide
to elect new government with a mandate of noncompliance. Interestingly, while the riots
in Greece evinced great outrage over the terms of austerity, there were seemingly no riots
in the street about the possible illegality of such a bailout under the governing EU
treaties.
The treaty language that served as the purported legal basis for this initial Greek bailout
exposes the chasm between the problem at hand and any potential legal solution. Origi-
nally, the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Community (EEC or Rome Treaty) did
not even contain the term "financial assistance" under any of its articles.76 Only after the
Euro had been launched amidst the dubious fiscal circumstances of its constituents did the
EEC (as amended by the Treaty of Nice in 2001) adopt the following language: "where a
Member State is in difficulties ... caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences
beyond its control, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Com-
mission, may grant, under certain conditions, Community financial assistance to the Member
State concerned" (emphasis added).77 In yet another display of the growing political con-
straints to reform, the unanimous assent required to ratify the terms of the Treaty of Nice
was not initially attained.78 Ireland rejected the treaty by referendum, a procedure re-
quired by the Irish Constitution.79 Only after additional political wrangling was unanim-
ity within the Eurozone secured.80 Later, the European Union again revised the terms,
removing the "qualified majority" requirement as a condition for providing such "financial
assistance."81 Instead, such authority was left solely to "the Council, on a proposal from
the Commission" to determine whether financial assistance would be provided.82 But
critically, the language stipulating that the cause of such "difficult[y]" must be "beyond
[the assisted country's] control" remained in the body of what was at that time Article 100
of the EEC.83 Many supporters of the bailout indicated that there was enough ambiguity
in the legal terms of this article to survive a legal challenge84 Others argued that the plain
meaning of the language precluded such an action.85 While little doubt existed that
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, available at http://www.eurotreaties.com/rometreaty.pdf (as in effect 1958).
77. See Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related
Acts, art. 100, 2001 OJ. C 80/1, (as in effect 2005) (now as amended TFEU art. 122).
78. See Ireland Rejects EU Expansion, BBC NEWS oune 8, 2001, 6:07 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/1376379.stn.
79. See Vaughne Miller, The Irish Referendum on the Treaty ofNice, (Int'l Affairs and Defence Section, House
of Commons Library, Research Paper 01/57, 2001).
80. Twenty-sixth Amendment of the Constitution Act 2002 (Ir.).
81. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 122, May 9, 2008,
2008 OJ. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Greece was indeed in a difficult spot, many expressed skepticism that the problem was
derived from "exceptional occurrences beyond its control."8 6 To the contrary, many be-
lieved that Greece had sealed its own fate with a feckless, corrupt tax regime and anti-
competitive policies that expanded the welfare state at the expense of the country's own
financial health 87-policy choices that were all directed by the Greek government. Under
this thinking, it would be quite a stretch to contend that this Greek bailout comported
with the foregoing terms of the presently named Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU) (previously the EEC and renamed as part of the highly controversial
Lisbon Treaty).88
The TFEU contained the following provision in Article 125, informally dubbed the
"No Bailout" provision, that seemed to clarify further the notion that treaty law prohib-
ited the sort of bailout provided to Greece: "the Union shall not be liable for or assume
the commitments. . . or public undertakings of any Member State. . . A Member State
shall not be liable for or assume the commitments . .. or public undertakings of another
Member State." 89 Again, supporters of the bailout could point to the fact that, under the
terms of the bailout, the European Union was not technically liable for Greece's debt, nor
was it assuming any of Greece's obligations; the Union was, technically speaking, making
an investment in Greece.
Eventually, the principal legal challenge to the bailout-taken up by several prominent
German academics-failed in Germany's Federal Constitutional Court.90 In essence, the
treaty language seemed to be toothless-not unenforceable, but simply unenforced. Will-
ingness on the part of the relevant Eurozone authorities to side-step this legal concern
arguably signaled a preference toward expediency over the law that could be portrayed in
parallel to the Euro States' failure to adhere to the Convergence Criteria and SGP
terms-the same sort of avoidance of the law that permitted the fiscal misbehavior within
the Eurozone that brought about this very crisis.
Immediately after the bailout, it seemed possible that neither legal restraints under the
EU treaties nor upheaval from domestic political backlash would stop the bailout plan
designed to alleviate the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. If the EU-IMF loan were
to be successful in its goal of helping Greece attain a sustainable fiscal path, then the
problem would be solved. Unfortunately, though Greece had the legal and political ne-
cessities in hand, its economic reality continued to slip away from the fiscal benchmarks
that could predicate a deal for reform. 91
86. TFEU, supra note 81, art. 122.
87. See Gopalan, supra note 84.
88. See Lisbon Treaty: What They Said, BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2009, 3:49 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/8282241.stm (displaying quotes from European leaders indicative of the contentiousness of the pro-
posed Lisbon Treaty).
89. TFEU, supra note 81, art. 125.
90. See Nicholas Kulish, German Court Refects Challenges to Euro Bailouts N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 8, 2011, at A6,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/world/europe/08germany.html?pagewanted=all&rr=0.
91. See James G. Neuger, Greece Striggles to Win Second Financial Bailout as Europe's Doubts Mount, BLoom-
BERG (Feb. 15, 2012, 3:05 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-14/greece-struggles-to-win-sec
ond-bailout.html.
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A. EXTEND AND PRETEND
Even after the aid package provided to Greece in 2010, the country's financial health
continued to deteriorate. 92 By 2011, the budget assumptions that underpinned the path to
Greece's economic viability (and therefore renewed ability to access the capital markets)
were eviscerated. 93 Austerity remained deeply unpopular politically, and further fiscal
tightening on the part of the borrower threatened two dangerous prospects: (1) that the
contraction in government spending would fuel the borrowing country's recession and
further depress tax revenue; and (2) that the citizens of that country-sufficiently discon-
tented with austerity-would take the aforementioned political action to reject the terms,
forcing a default and painful disassociation from the Euro. Many began to consider the
possibility that any future decision to lend to Greece might ultimately amount to nothing
more than throwing good money after bad.- After all, these Euro loans are obliged to be
repaid by Greece in Euros. If Greece could not close its budget deficit, no surplus could
ever exist from which the country could repay the debt.
Important voices within the European Union-including British officials-expressed
disapproval and hesitance to extend additional credit to Greece on nothing more than a
hollow notion of long-run solvency 95 (a cleverly nicknamed practice by the financial com-
munity: "extend and pretend").96 Political pressure continued to build within Greece, as
well, and new anti-austerity political forces began to take shape.97 Neither the creditors
nor the debtor seemed content with a bailout package that wasn't solving the problem.
But still few key parties viewed the alternative-Greece's default and disassociation-as a
viable option.9 8
B. A BAILOUT TO SAVE THE BAILOUT
While a solution to the long-term problem remained elusive, Greece's immediate fail-
ure to meet budget projections forced a response to the near-term exigency. Greece was
again running short of money and time-failure to take immediate, effective action im-
plied default. 99 In response, the Troika (the informal name given to the committee con-
sisting of the IMF, the ECB, and the European Commission) organized a second bailout
package to be delivered in 2012.100 This time, in addition to more money, extended dura-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See James G. Neuger & Jonathan Sterns, Europe Gives Greece 2 More Years to Reach Deficit Targets,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2012, 7:32 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1l-12/europe-gives-greece-
2-more-years-to-reach-deficit-debt-targets.html.
95. See UK 'Should Not join Greek Bail-Out', THE INDEP. (June 17, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/politics/uk-should-not-join-greek-bailout-2298979.html.
96. See, e.g., John Carney, How European Banks Play Ertend and Pretend Right Now, CNBC (Nov. 25, 2011,
10:48 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/45435825/How-EuropeananksPlayExtend-andPretendRight
Now.
97. See Howard Schneider, Greece's Political Changes Put Bailout, Euro at Risk, WASH. PosT, May 31, 2012,
at 31, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-05-31/business/35457438_I-bailout-program-
syriza-socialist-pasok.
98. See, e.g., Shrikesh Laxmidas, ECB's Costa Says Portugal Selective Default Not Option, REUTERS (July 22,
2011, 6:32 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/22/uk-ecb-costa-idTKTRE76L4F720110722.
99. See Neuger & Stems, supra note 94.
100. Id.
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tion for repayment, and a lowering of interest rates attached to much of the debt, the
Troika coordinated a large, one-time debt-reduction by convincing many institutional
holders of Greek debt-principally various European banks-to accept a "write down," a
reduction in the principal owed on Greece's sovereign bonds held by the banks.' 0' This
was the first meaningful step in the direction of an orderly restructuring of Greek debt in
total-a procedure fraught with legal and political difficulty, yet championed by many
experts as the only means to resolve the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.102 In return for
all of the assistance from abroad, Greece agreed to implement further austerity by tighten-
ing its fiscal policy, both in the near-term and in the form of long-term obligations previ-
ously taken on by the state. 0 3 Tens of thousands of Greeks again filled the streets in
protest. 04 The riots could be seen as an emotional manifestation of the growing political
intent within Greece to cast off the terms of austerity. In parallel, the Greek Parliament
faced some political opposition in the austerity vote tied to this second bailout, and the
measure passed with 199 votes to 74.105 Again required to take legislative action on aus-
terity in late 2012, the parliament found its pro-bailout coalition dwindling, with only 153
votes to 128 affirming implementation of the austerity conditions necessary to hold every-
thing together. 0 6 Thus the Troika and Greece faced not just legal questions of their
present and past actions, but also an eroding political landscape foreshadowing new, reac-
tive legal impediments to future steps forward in this unpopular bailout-for-austerity
program.
Opponents were again quick to criticize the second bailout package as simply throwing
good money after bad.' 0 7 To be sure, Greece's projected budget under the bailout, while
better than without the bailout, was still a long-term mess without a clear manner of
resolution. 08 Yet the second bailout package-particularly in its consummation of the
largest sovereign debt write-down in history, eliminating more than 100 billion Euros off
of the total debt owed by Greece-shined hope on a situation many considered lost.109
Officials grappling with the problem of Greece's debt load demonstrated that this power-
ful measure-viewed by many as critical in solving the long-term crisis-could, in fact, be
achieved. Given its importance, the legal underpinnings of this principal write-down, how
101. See Matina Stevis, Euro-Zone Countries Sign Greek Bailout Deal, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2012, 8:10 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304692804577281053 193863424.html.
102. See Luke Baker, Greece's Finances 'Hugely Off Track', FIN. PosT (July 24, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://busi
ness.financialpost.com/2012/07/24/greeces-finances-hugely-off-track/. (quoting several EU officials regard-
ing the need for additional restructuring in the future).
103. See Ben Rooney, Greek Parliament Approves Austerity Package, CNN MONEY (Feb. 12, 2012, 8:13 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/10/markets/greeceyote/index.htm.
104. Id.
105. Ian Traynor & Helena Smith, Greece Approves Austerity Cuts to Secure Eurozone Bailout and Avoid Debt
Default, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 2012, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/12/
greece-austerity-cuts-euro-bailout.
106. See Elinda Labropoulou & Laura Smith-Spark, Greek Parliament Approves Austerity Cuts, CNN (Nov. 7,
2012, 11:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/1 1/07/world/europe/greece-austerity.
107. See Constantine Von Hoffman, New Greece Bailout Faces Deep Skepticism, CBS MONEYWATC-H (Nov.
14, 2012, 7:21 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123-162-57549148/new-greece-bailout-faces-deep-
skepticism/.
108. Id.
109. See Stevis, supra note 101.
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it was achieved, and whether it may be useful in the future, merit analysis in light of the
massive problem that still remains.
C. GErrING TO THE WRrrE-DowN
The debtor-creditor relationships created in the sovereign debt market are quite com-
plex. Consider, for comparison, a local bank issuing a mortgage to a home purchaser. If
the borrower fails to pay under the terms of the mortgage, the lender will seize the
home-there is a straightforward relationship not just between the single debtor and the
single creditor in this instance, but also between the borrowed money and the financed
asset. On the other hand, sovereigns typically execute bonds, one ad hoc issuance after
another, each having its own terms and covenants. Though ownership of these debts may
begin in the hands of a limited number of large multinational banks, they ultimately may
find themselves held in varied increments by those who acquire such a stake in the secon-
dary market.10 Where a mortgagee can negotiate across the table from a homeowner in
arrears, it is a logistical impossibility to suppose that a sovereign such as Greece, in its
complex democratic representation, would be able to negotiate with each of the countless
holders of its debt, including individuals and entities from all over the world, in order to
find unanimity in reforming the terms of the bonds for all parties involved in an organized
debt restructuring. A sovereign may come to mutually agreeable terms with even a major-
ity of holders of its extant debt, yet intransigence on the part of residual bondholders
representing the minority (i.e. those who do not accede to the terms of the contract refor-
mation) may block any change to the bond terms whatsoever."' For an entity under
severe financial strain and loaded with debt, creditors have at least some logical incentive
to accede to reformation; if the burden of interest service costs is so high as to suggest that
the entity will eventually be forced into default, a creditor will perhaps seek to renegotiate
terms on the bonds in order to extract all possible value from the debtor without the legal
costs and delays associated with a default and bankruptcy (or related) proceedings. But in
the instance of an acceding majority and a refusing minority, the majority will be far less
likely to reform its own terms, knowing that the resultant incremental benefit from debt
forgiveness will flow to the minority (that still stands to be paid in full on the unrevised
terms of the bonds) at the sake of the write-down taken by the majority.
D. THE CAC PROVIsION
With this dynamic in mind, it is critical to the goal of achieving a write-down that there
be included in a bond's contractual terms a specific provision allowing a qualifying plural-
ity of bondholders to enforce the renegotiated terms of the bond upon all holders of the
entire extant bond issue. This would create a sort of legal fiction: unanimity where none
exists. This legal mechanism, referred to as a Collective Action Clause (CAC), can force
the hand of an intransigent group of bondholders, thereby circumventing the aforemen-
110. See Dave Kansas, Greece, Ireland, Portugal: Who Holds the Debt?, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2011, 12:13 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/06/15/greece-ireland-portugal-who-holds-the-debtl (delineating the
various types of entities around the world that hold the sovereign debts of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal).
111. See, e.g., Nakbeel Bondholders Seeking Full Repayment - Source, REUTERs (Dec. 8, 2009, 10:20 AM), http:/
/www.reuters.com/article/200 9 /12/08/dubai-nakheel-debt-idUSGEE5B717G20091208 (reporting on an ex-
ample of such a blocking minority of bondholders in a corporate context).
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tioned majority-minority problem that can stall efforts toward such reform.112 Interest-
ingly, at the time of Greece's 2012 debt restructuring, the bonds subject to the write-
down contained no such CAC provisions in their original indentures,1 3 yet the eventually
negotiated write-down did not achieve unanimous consent amongst the bondholders.' 14
A further irony, Greece's bonds that actually included a CAC provision (a small fraction of
Greece's debt)11s were not ultimately subjected to a principal write-down in the large
restructuring coincident with the second bailout." 6 This baffling contradiction in the
case of Greece's debt restructuring is explained by the extraordinary influence that a sov-
ereign bond's legal jurisdiction can have on the financial outcome for creditors, perhaps
even more weighty than the contractual terms printed on the face of the bond indenture.
E. THE CHOICE OF LAw DIsrINcIoN
Historically, issuers of sovereign debt in less developed countries often issued their
bonds under foreign law, principally that of England or the United States, as a means to
entice the private markets to purchase the debt.117 The rationale for this was intuitive;
bonds governed by the law of less developed countries-typically with less stable political
environments-would fail to inspire as much investor confidence that the terms as written
in the bond indenture would actually be enforced, as compared to bond terms subject to
enforcement under the laws of a more developed, stable nation. These latter bonds are
called foreign-law bonds, as opposed to domestic-law bonds (i.e. those bonds that are
subject to the judicial authority of the country from which they're issued).1ls Thus, a
business entity or a government that borrows by issuing bonds with foreign choice-of-law
may theoretically be subject to an adverse judgment from a foreign court for actions that,
as adjudged by a domestic court, are without fault. In contrast, the domestic judiciary
would have sole authority to mete out the resolution to disputes involving domestic-law
bonds. There is no reason for an investor to expect, ex ante, a breach of a bond contract,
let alone a breach that would result in two drastically different legal outcomes in two
sovereign jurisdictions. As such, domestic and foreign-law bonds have a recent history (in
the years prior to the Credit Crisis) of only a "small. . . but discernible" distinction in
investor demand, as reflected by closely mirroring prices and yields between the two
112. See Melissa A. Boudreau, Restructuring Sovereign Debt Under Local Law: Are Retrofit Collective Action
Clauses Expropriatory?, 2 HARv. Bus. L. REv. ONLINE 164, 167 (2012), available at http://www.hblr.org/2012/
05/retrofit-collective-action-clauses/.
113. Id.
114. The ramifications of the Greek Bondholder Act explain this paradox. See infra note 123. See Maria
Petrakis & Rebecca Christie, Greece Pushes Bondholders into Record Debt Swap, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 9, 2012,
11:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-09/greece-debt-swap-tops-95-level-to-trigger-
forced-bondholder-participation.html.
115. StephenJ. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Greek Case
Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism 3 (John M. Olin Law and Econ., Working
Paper No. 541, 2010), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/wp501-550.
116. Alkman Granitsas & Nektaria Stamouli, Greece to Pay Foreign-Law Bond, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2012,
5:55 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304192704577405530518089326.htnl.
117. Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 115, at 14.
118. See John Glover & Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Greek Default Risk Returns as Bond Maturity Nears, BLOOM-
BERG (May 8, 2012, 5:39 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-08/greek-default-risk-returns-as-
bond-maturity-nears.html.
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types.'1 9 After all, an insolvent business entity or individual would expect no Deus Ex
Machina in the form of legislative action absolving that entity of its debt obligations,
irrespective of whether disputes over that entity's bonds were justiciable at home or
abroad. But where there may be little or no alignment of interests between a sovereign
government's legislature and a constituent business entity or individual, a sovereign nation
possesses an enticing means of solving its own financial problems through legislative ac-
tion on its own behalf.120 Herein lies the key distinction in an instance of sovereign insol-
vency; if a bankrupt country owes debts governed by its own law, what's to stop that
country from simply changing the law in order to manufacture a legal solution to its finan-
cial problems? It is not entirely clear, but the answer, it seems, is probably not much.121
In the case of Greece's record-setting debt restructuring, this dynamic was no less than
integral in achieving a more favorable outcome for Greece than would have otherwise
been possible. 122
As mentioned above, the vast majority of Greece's extant debt at the time of the restruc-
turing existed in the form of domestic-law bonds, while approximately one-tenth of the
extant debt was governed by foreign law, principally that of England.123 Moreover, this
domestic-law majority-totaling at the time of restructuring in excess of 200 billion Eu-
ros-was subject to contract terms that contained no CAC provision at all.124 Therefore,
under the terms of these bonds, Greece would have had to secure consent from every such
bondholder in order to affect the complete restructuring in the manner it was eventually
achieved. Any holdouts to the write-down of these domestic law bonds would not only
directly diminish the overall quantity of debt reduction, but also (and perhaps more im-
portantly) indirectly threaten the accession of other bondholders by way of the aforemen-
tioned majority-minority dilemma.
F. REWRTING THE RULES
On February 23, 2012, the Greek Parliament built a legal bridge to reach a broad-based
write-down when the legislature passed a law that became known as the Greek Bond-
holder Act.125 Among other provisions, one key feature of this law was to install a statu-
tory CAC mechanism on Greece's domestic-law bonds. 126 Somewhat controversially,
these terms were also retrofitted to bonds issued before the law was drafted, in essence
changing the terms of the deal with investors after the deal was made.127 The question has
been raised whether such a retroactive application of a CAC provision to force the hand of
a withholding creditor minority into a restructuring may amount to some manner of ex-
119. Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 115, at 6.
120. See id. at 3.
121. See generally Boudreau, supra note 112.
122. See Greek Government's Official Terms for Bond Swap with Creditors: Statement, BLOOMBERG (Feb, 24,
2012, 11:44 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-24/greek-government-s-official-terms-for-
bond-swap-with-creditors-statement (containing the terms of the restructuring offer as represented in the
text of the Greek government's press release on the matter) [hereinafter Greek Government's Official Terms].
123. Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 115, at 2.
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propriation, and if so, whether it could predicate a successful cause of action brought in a
foreign jurisdiction against Greece.128 To date, however, the question seems mainly aca-
demic, and Greece appears the beneficiary of the conventional wisdom that it is easier to
obtain forgiveness than permission. The CAC alteration was quite material, indeed.
Where, before the Greek Bondholder Act, even an acute minority consisting of one bond-
holder could hold out to a proposed restructuring, the terms of the Act turned this dy-
namic on its head; now as few as roughly one-third of bondholders were theoretically
required to approve restructuring terms that would then bind the remaining bondhold-
ers.129 With a wave of the legislative wand, Greece not only changed the rules of the
financial negotiations, but also showed its creditors that it could punish any future inflexi-
bility with unpleasant legislative reform. By March 2012 an excess of the requisite portion
of domestic-law bondholders (including only private entities) had approved the restructur-
ing terms, and the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history became one of the many
provisions of the second bailout.130
IV. Barely Treading Water
Though the second bailout did forestall an immediate unraveling in Greece and the
Eurozone, it did not achieve a solution to the intractable issue of sovereign insolvency.i3
Experts expressed skepticism that the additional lending conferred no benefit, save time,
with one bank executive bluntly noting that the bailout "doesn't do anything to put
Greece on a sustainable path." 32 The private markets reflected this same sentiment, as
within weeks of the bailout Greece's debt again tumbled in price to such a discount as to
imply the expectation of yet another (i.e. third) bailout at some point in the future.133
Many financial experts felt that the write-down had not been substantial enough.134 To
wit, the bailout with the largest write-down in history still left Greece with a projected
debt burden well in excess of its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP), even as far out as
a decade into the future.135 A ratio of total debt to annual GDP in excess of one is often
cited as the breaking point for insolvency, wherein a lack of investor confidence from the
128. Among the various hurdles for such a legal claim would be not just satisfaction of the standard of
expropriation, but also potentially defense related to sovereign iununity. See generally Boudreau, supra note
112.
129. This is measured by voting based upon face value of the holders' total debt, where only half is needed to
form a quorum, and only two-thirds of that quorum is needed to approve the restructuring terms. See Greek
Government's Official Terms, supra note 122.
130. See Glover & Chassany, supra note 118.
131. See Paul Dobson, Greece's Third Bailout Seen in Debt with Junk Grade: Euro Credit, BLOOMBERG (Mar.
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private markets requires some manner of bailout from public entities (i.e. official entities)
to avert default.136
A. THE EcoNoMic PicruiE, DARKER STLL
Ironically, total Greek sovereign debt actually increased during 2012, the same year in
which approximately 120 billion Euros worth of such debt was forgiven.137 There were
many contributing factors to this increase in debt, but one notable feature of the restruc-
turing certainly didn't help; only private creditors were subjected to the write-down, even
though much of Greece's public debts were and are today held by public entities, includ-
ing other sovereign governments and intergovernmental organizations (principally those
of the Troika).138 The lack of participation from such public creditors was no mere over-
sight; while political opposition to austerity was slowly building within Greece, political
opposition to these bailouts was also gathering steam abroad. 39 With Greece showing no
clear path to financial self-sufficiency, the notion that these other nations would then start
forgiving loans to Greece-in effect creating an international mechanism for wealth trans-
fer-would be deeply unpopular politically and likely untenable in the long term.140 Evi-
dence suggests that such an act of debt forgiveness may simply be impossible because it
would be deemed to violate EU treaty terms or sovereign law within Eurozone coun-
tries.141 In essence, the parties attempting to engineer a solution to this crisis were made
powerless, stuck between the required enormity of any successful financial intervention
and the constraints, both legal and political, to achieving such an intervention.142 The
problem writ large was captured well in the following excerpt from an editorial from the
Financial Times: "by agreeing [to] an aid package that they know [isn't] sufficient, the
[E]urozone. . . is true to form. . . its approach has been a halfway house of resisting a
sovereign default but not doing enough to remove the risk altogether... core govern-
ments find it politically impossible to put up more money."143
B. LOSING FLEXIBILITY
On paper, the second bailout included mechanisms that increased flexibility for Greece
and the international parties seeking to stem the crisis. But in reality, these reforms
136. See Zsolt Darvas, The Greek Debt Trap: An Escape Plan, BRUEGEL POLICY CONTRIBUION (Bruegel,
Brussels, Belg.), Nov. 2012, at 1, 2, available at http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-listing/?au
thor= 1 9-zsolt-darvas&category=&topic=&year=&sort=date.
137. See id. at 3, 14.
138. See Dobson, supra note 131. See also Paul Taylor, A Fleeting Hint of Softening in Germany's Debt Stance,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/business/global/a-fleeting-hint-of-soften
ing-in-germanys-debt-stance.html?-r=0.
139. See, e.g., Erik Kirschbaum, Germans Overwhelmingly Oppose Greek Bailout: Poll, REuTERS (Feb. 26, 2012,
9:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/26/us-eurozone-germany-poll-idUSTRE81POBW20120
226.
140. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 138.
141. A German court opinion, issued at the bequest of the German government, intimated that credit losses
stemming from Greek loans would be a violation of Article 125 of the TFEU, as well as German budgetary
law. See id.
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brought about a certain unfortunate irony. During 2012, holdings of Greece's sovereign
debt by private entities decreased, as many of these obligations were diminished through
the restructuring write-down, but debt held by other sovereign governments and interna-
tional organizations increased in light of the new bailout lending along with zero offset-
ting write-downs of outstanding debt held by these same public entities.144 Though
Greece had passed the Greek Bondholder Act in order to achieve a write-down of its
untenable sovereign debt load, the entities that were increasingly Greece's creditors after
the write-down were the very entities that could not (or perhaps would not) participate in
such a write-down.145 In essence, public creditors had replaced private creditors, and the
CAC provisions-the principal tool developed in the struggle to this point-were applica-
ble only to privately-held debts.146 The legal maneuvers available were yet again a step
behind the financial and political turmoil, both of which continued to pick up steam
through 2012.
As anticipated by the private markets and many experts, Greece's economic condition
continued to deteriorate after the second bailout. 147 Austerity programs implemented in
rapid succession drove Greece into a deeper and longer recession than had been "antici-
pated" in budgetary projections that were clearly unrealistic in hindsight. 48 The Greek
economy was estimated to shrink meaningfully in 2012 and again in 2013.149 The multi-
year recession cumulatively diminished Greece's GDP by one-fifth, and thus Greece's
debt-to-GDP ratios appeared again to be entirely unsustainable. 50 The bailout-for-aus-
terity mechanism was not only failing to drive this critical debt-to-GDP ratio to a level
that would imply sustainability for Greece, it was also motivating political developments
that threatened to reject the mechanism outright.' 5
C. POLITcAL UPRISING
By mid to late 2012, the bailout-for-austerity program, which had survived as the pri-
mary tool in the debt crisis despite its questionable legal footing, faced a formidable legal
threat in the form of the democratic processes within the participating countries of the
lenders and debtors alike.152 In advance of the May 2012 parliamentary elections in
Greece, for example, the two leading parties in the polls, New Democracy (ND) and
Coalition of the Radical Left - Unitary Social Movement (SYRIZA), had diametrically
144. See Darvas, supra note 136, at 3 (outlining in the numerical table at right the changing components of
Greece's sovereign debt over 2012).
145. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 138.
146. Id.




150. See id. This increase in the ratio results from the decrease in the denominator (GDP) but also from the
indirect effect on the numerator (debt) derived from weaker economic performance leading to less tax reve-
nue and therefore greater debt financing.
151. See Abram Brown, Greek Elections: Investors, Take a Moment to Cheer Pro-Bailout Party's Victory, FORBES
(June 17, 2012, 4:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2012/06/17/greek-elections-investors-
take-a-moment-to-cheer-pro-bailout-partys-victory/.
152. See, e.g., id.
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opposing views on the management of the sovereign debt crisis.153 Where ND was, in
essence, a pro-bailout party that could be relied upon to cram though legislation on aus-
terity that was needed in exchange for the release of additional international financing,
SYRIZA adamantly rejected the bailout-for-austerity process and promised to "tear up"
Greece's existing bailout agreements.154 It was unclear by May which of the two parties
would command a plurality in Greek Parliament,'ss and the world watched in fear as
Greeks went to the polls to determine, in part, the fate of the Euro. A second election in
June-required due to the inconclusive nature of the preceding month's election's6-gave
ND a thin margin over its rival SYRIZA, 29.7 percent to 26.9 percent. 57 Critically,
Greek law provides that the party commanding a winning plurality be allotted fifty bonus
seats in the 300-seat Parliament. 58 ND was therefore allotted 129 seats to SYRIZA's 71
seats, despite the closeness of the popular vote between the two parties.159 Global finan-
cial markets reacted positively to the news, seemingly ignoring the growing popularity of
the anti-austerity movement and the long-run implications it may have.160 As mentioned
previously, the austerity vote in Greek Parliament in November 2012 demonstrated a far
narrower approval of the bailout program.161 In light of this measure's margin of ap-
proval-just twenty-five votes-the crucial role of the fifty bonus seats, allocated in accor-
dance with Greek law, in saving the bailout program in 2012 is clear.162 Despite the
success in passing these austerity measures, the ruling coalition in Greece has, since that
time, essentially watched the political floor collapse underneath them.163 More recently,
SYRIZA holds a lead over ND of 4.5 percent, as reflected in polling conducted near year-
end 2012.164 In a frightening side note, Golden Dawn, a party that aligns with SYRIZA
on the issue of rejecting the bailout program but also has a virulently anti-immigrant
platform, has gained immensely in popularity. 65 Much as ND formed a coalition to reach
a pro-bailout majority, an anti-bailout majority could exist in SYRIZA and Golden Dawn,
should current political momentum continue. In a sense, then, Greece is a ticking time
bomb; though the current government can perpetuate the bailout process, it is only a
matter of time before the democratic process affirms or rejects this methodology. And if
current projections hold, the prospect of an outright rejection of the bailout methodology,




156. See Greece to Hold New Elections on 17 June, BBC NEWS (May 16, 2012, 9:25 AM), http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18082552.
157. See Brown, supra note 151.
158. See Greece to Hold New Elections on 17 June, supra note 156 (footnoted in the diagram of Greek Parlia-
ment at bottom).
159. See Brown, supra note 151.
.160. See id.
161. See Labropoulou & Smith-Spark, supra note 106.
162. See id.
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D. CONTAGION
The political drama in Greece in the summer of 2012 not only jolted financial markets,
but also instilled a new, awakened sense of danger and urgency within the intergovern-
mental pro-bailout affiliates, principally the Troika. While Greece was perhaps the most
immediate and advanced problem, threats existed all over the Eurozone from other coun-
tries that were drowning in their unsustainable sovereign debt obligations.166 Most nota-
bly, Spain and Italy were experiencing tremendous challenges in financing their debts in
the private markets,167 and these two countries combined were roughly ten times larger
than Greece, as measured by each country's GDP.168 While it could be argued that the
impact to the international community, especially the Eurozone, of a Greek default alone
may be containable, the disassociation of larger economies such as Italy and Spain from
the Eurozone would create a problem that many policymakers feared would have a cata-
strophic, immitigable impact.169 Lending in exchange for austerity, irrespective of the
details, simply failed to derive the results necessary to bring the Eurozone to long-run
sustainability, and nothing evidenced the acceptance of this bitter conclusion more than
the controversial decision of Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, to
institute a conditional but indefinite bond-buying program-an international course of
Quantitative Easing.170
E. A BAILOUT By ANY OTHER NAME
In September 2012, the ECB revealed its plan to stabilize the Eurozone through an
indefinite program of purchasing Eurozone countries' sovereign debt in the secondary
markets.'17 In exchange for this support, a Eurozone country would, as a precondition,
need to submit to and implement an internationally agreed-upon austerity framework and
bailout package.172 These strict conditions could be seen as a manner of compromise
meant to assuage the concerns of many within the Eurozone who viewed this financial
practice as dangerous or simply wrong. One such disapproving party was Germany. 7 3
Through its Bundesbank, Germany cast the sole vote against the bond-buying program
amongst the ECB's Governing Council of twenty-three members. 74 Many officials
within Germany remain quite skeptical of a monetary policy that is arguably the
166. See Ian Traynor, ECB Introduces Unlimited Bond-Buying in Boldest Attempt Yet to End Euro Crisis, THE
GUARDILA (Sept. 6, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/06/debt-crisis-mario-
draghi.
167. See id.
168. See In Graphics: Eurozone in Crisis, BBC NEWS (May 24, 2010, 12:03 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
10150056.
169. See generally Charles Forelle, Contagion Fears Hit Markets, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2012, 11:57 AM),
available at httpJ/online.wsj.com/article/SBl0001424052702303505504577404363902375658.html.
170. See Traynor, supra note 166.
171. See id. This action would directly-and by means of investor confidence-drive down yields on the
debt of the country whose bonds are being purchased, thereby lowering their financing costs and prevent a
debt spiral. See Shuman, supra note 18; see also supra note 30.
172. See Traynor, supra note 166.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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equivalent of money printing.175 This is true not only because Germany, as a lender,
would naturally scrutinize the financial prospects of any borrowing country as to avoid
prospective losses from a non-paying debtor nation. Perhaps more importantly, Ger-
many's history with loose monetary policy still weighs heavily on its citizens and policy-
makers. In the early twentieth century, German monetary policy brought on catastrophic
hyperinflation that crippled the economy and attended such social havoc as would later
afford the Nazi Party its foothold.176 (It may serve well to consider now the recent ascen-
sion of the Golden Dawn in Greece, the party symbol of which looks quite like a Swas-
tika). Thus, the fear articulated by German officials of the ECB's proposed bond-buying
plan was that such a program would not only risk taking the Eurozone down a slippery
slope toward inflationary havoc and real financial losses, 77 but also the related conse-
quences-social, political, et cetera-could be quite unpleasant, as well.178 Despite these
legitimate long-term concerns, the plan was put into place in the second half of 2012, and
financial markets immediately embraced the idea.179 This expressed willingness of the
ECB to step in as a buyer of last resort buoyed investor confidence in sovereign debt
across the Eurozone. 80 Interest rates demanded in the financial markets for new borrow-
ing across these countries dropped, and the volatility of these rates likewise diminished.' 8'
Without actually having to employ the new mechanism, the ECB brought a several-
month period of relative calm to the debt markets through merely its announcement and
creation.182 All of this, of course, did nothing to resolve the underlying issue; a multitude
of Eurozone nations went into 2013 with roughly the same quality of (or perhaps worse)
economic data that brought on insolvency fears and the sovereign debt crisis in the
Eurozone in the first place.' 83
V. Conclusion
Coming full circle to assess the state of the current law-the recent Fiscal Compact-
and whether it is suited or potentially will be suited to the immense challenges outlined in
the foregoing, these words of T.S. Eliot ring true, "and the end of our exploring will be to




177. "Real," as used here, is in the economic sense; a real loss can occur when inflation exceeds financial
return. For example, the ECB could print money to pay off all troubled Eurozone debts, but creditors would
suffer meaningful real losses as a result of the drastic increase in the money supply leading to higher inflation
(i.e. depreciation of the Euro).
178. See id.
179. See Jeff Black, Coene Says ECB's "Nuclear Deterrent" Should Ideally Stay Unused, BLOOMBERG Gan. 27,





183. See Nouriel Roubini, Opinion, The YearAhead in the Eurozone: Lower Risks, Same Prohlems, THE GREAT
DEBATE BLOG, RELTTERS (Jan. 14, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/14/the-year-ahead-
in-the-euro-zone-lower-risks-same-problems/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
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arrive where we started and know the place for the first time."1 84 At a glance, the terms of
the Compact are strict indeed.s85 Eurozone nations must adhere to certain benchmarks of
fiscal conservatism or otherwise be subject to automatic remediation measures. 86 If the
signatory nations simply were to follow the terms of the TSCG as written and ratified, the
treaty would perhaps be nothing less than a "revolution. . . ending more than 30 years of
steadily rising public debt."1s? But history betrays this outlandish prospect.
A monetary union consummated upon deceit, omission, and outright flaunting of treaty
terms now seeks to overlay another, stricter benchmark-based fiscal union between its
Member States. 88 One may rightly wonder, haven't I heard this tune before? The eco-
nomic and political realities facing Germany and Greece (as well as important debtor
nations including Italy and Spain) are entirely inconsonant with the strictures of the Fiscal
Compact; at present, these debtor nations seem bent to their maximum under austerity
and debt burdens.'89 It strains credulity to imagine that implementation of the Fiscal
Compact will inspire debtor nations to adhere to its terms, at least not in the foreseeable
future-no more so than talking about nice weather would quicker stop the rain.190
It is convenient to imagine that debt refinancing can occur indefinitely, thereby obviat-
ing the need for real reform that would bring financial sustainability to these debtor states.
But that which cannot go on forever must eventually stop. And no country can expect to
grow its debt at an unbounded pace for an unbounded time, even if supported by an
indefinite program of Quantitative Easing. Consider the following all-too-possible scena-
rio: what would happen if a sovereign had debt grow to be so large that the interest costs
on that debt exceeded that country's entire tax revenue? No longer would the value of
collected taxes be returned to constituents in the form of government services and
goods-instead, all of that value would be transferred around the world to holders of that
nation's debt. How long might constituents in a representative democracy tolerate such
punishment for past mistakes?
A puttering wait-and-see agenda that leans on the ECB for indefinite bond purchases is
the long road to ruin. Hope is not a strategy, and especially not when the desired out-
come runs contrary to observable data trending in the opposite direction.191 The reality is
that in Greece, and now notably in Italy, the political window for meaningful legal reform
is small and shrinking fast.192 In many parts of Europe the recession continues to new
184. T.S. ELIOT, FOUR QUARTETS 4: LIrrLE GIDDING (1942), available at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/
history/winter/w3206/edit/tselioditdegidding.html.
185. See Marcus Walker, Planned Budget Treaty Would be Neither Panacea Nor Poison, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31,




188. See BAGUS, supra note 3, at 30-33.
189. See Roubini, supra note 183.
190. See Eurozone Crisis Explained, supra note 147.
191. SeeJack Ewing, Southern Europe's Recession Threatens to Spread Nortb, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2013, at Bi,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/business/southem-europes-recession-threatens-to-spread-
north.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
192. See Patrick Donahue, Euro Leaders Demand Austerity as Italy Moves Closer to New Vote, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 3, 2013, 9:29 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-03/euro-leaders-demand-austerity-as-
italy-moves-closer-to-new-vote.html.
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lows in 2013.193 Effective reform, if it occurs, will likely establish an unprecedented legal
standard, perhaps including colossal write-downs by public creditors, but more likely an
overhaul of the administration of the Euro.194 Indeed, at this late hour it seems likely that
the composition of Eurozone countries will have to change, one way or another.195 From
the top down, public officials could choose to get ahead of the crisis by coordinating for a
given country a timely and financially-backstopped withdrawal from the Euro-perhaps
even removing one of the stronger Euro States first-to demonstrate control to the mar-
kets, build confidence, and minimize the risk of contagion and panic. Or instead, those
same politicians could choose to stay the course with the Compact-hoping despite the
evidence that the conventional path will turn Europe's fate-until such time as the
Eurozone may rend itself apart by the democratic processes of its Member States. It may
at last be wise for policymakers to befriend the devil that they know is coming. Such
reformation of the Eurozone would indeed be unprecedented. But unprecedented, as
well, will be the global cataclysm if such reform fails to materialize. 96
193. See Ewing, supra note 191.
194. If, for instance, Germany's judiciary yields to accept the view that losses on publicly held debt do not
per se violate the law. But see FXTOP.COM, supra note 42.
195. See Brigitte Granville, Hans-Olaf Henkel & Stefan Kawalec, Save Europe: Split the Euro, BLOOMBERG
(May 14, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-14/save-europe-split-the-euro.html.
196. See Denise Wall, Finnish PM: Euro Breakup Would Result in 'Chaos', THE EURO CRIsIs BLOG, WALL ST.
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